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ABSTRACT
Objectives: US hospitals are expected to function without external aid for up to 96 hours during a
disaster; however, concern exists that there is insufficient capacity in hospitals to absorb large numbers
of acute casualties. The aim of the study was to determine the potential for creation of inpatient bed
surge capacity from the early discharge (reverse triage) of hospital inpatients at low risk of untoward
events for up to 96 hours.
Methods: In a health system with 3 capacity-constrained hospitals that are representative of US facilities
(academic, teaching affiliate, community), a variety (N  50) of inpatient units were prospectively
canvassed in rotation using a blocked randomized design for 19 weeks ending in February 2006.
Intensive care units (ICUs), nurseries, and pediatric units were excluded. Assuming a disaster
occurred on the day of enrollment, patients who did not require any (previously defined) critical
intervention for 4 days were deemed suitable for early discharge.
Results: Of 3491 patients, 44% did not require any critical intervention and were suitable for early
discharge. Accounting for additional routine patient discharges, full use of staffed and unstaffed
licensed beds, gross surge capacity was estimated at 77%, 95%, and 103% for the 3 hospitals.
Factoring likely continuance of nonvictim emergency admissions, net surge capacity available for
disaster victims was estimated at 66%, 71%, and 81%, respectively. Reverse triage made up the
majority (50%, 55%, 59%) of surge beds. Most realized capacity was available within 24 to 48 hours.
Conclusions: Hospital surge capacity for standard inpatient beds may be greater than previously believed.
Reverse triage, if appropriately harnessed, can be a major contributor to surge capacity. (Disaster Med
Public Health Preparedness. 2009;3(Suppl 1):S10–S16)
Great concern has arisen that there is insuffi-cient capacity in hospitals/health systems toabsorb large numbers of casualties during a
catastrophic event.1–4 Many alleviating measures re-
quire external support2,5; however, hospitals are ex-
pected to manage without expectation of external aid
for up to 96 hours.6
Surge capacity in the health care sector can be de-
fined as the maximum potential augmentation of
resources available to care for the influx of an unex-
pectedly large number of patients.7 Surge capacity
can be augmented by increasing resources, decreasing
demand, or redistributing assets.5,8 Means to achieve
the latter 2 are the most efficient and cost-effective.
From this perspective, the authors previously ad-
vanced the concept of reverse triage, wherein inpa-
tients at low risk for untoward events would be dis-
charged or transferred back to the community. This
approach gives inpatients and disaster victims equal
consideration for inpatient resources.9 A system of
considering patient risk profiles for early discharge
was recently published.8 We tested this concept and
tried to determine the potential contribution to the
augmentation of surge capacity during a catastrophic
event in a large health system with 3 diverse hospitals.
METHODS
Setting
The institutions studied were a health system’s 3
hospitals, 3 to 27 mi apart, each serving a distinct
area in Maryland. The hospitals were an inner-city
university hospital, a mid-size teaching affiliate in a
working class neighborhood, and a nonteaching com-
munity hospital located in a primarily affluent county
(Table 1). Patients from these hospitals were prospec-
tively sampled and surveyed as described below.
Design
Using a blocked randomized design controlling for
day of week, inpatient units at the 3 hospitals were
prospectively canvassed during a 19-week period end-
ing in February 2006. The underlying precept was that
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a major disaster occurred on the day of sampling at time 0 (T0).
Patients present on sampled units at T0 were followed for 4 days.
Selection of Study Subjects
There were 32, 12, and 6 inpatient units identified as appro-
priate for study in the academic center, teaching affiliate, and
community hospital, respectively. Pediatrics, newborn nurs-
ery, and ICUs were excluded because they were considered
special populations.8 Units at the affiliate and community
hospitals were sampled 2 and 4 times, respectively, as often as
the academic center to ensure an adequate sample size.
At the time of unit sampling, all of the patients included in
the morning census were identified for study. Demographic
and clinical information were abstracted from the medical
and billing records. Patients discharged on day T0 were
TABLE 2
Description of Study Population by Institution
Academic Center Teaching Affiliate Community Hospital Adjusted Total*
Enrolled 1352 1062 1077 3491
Age
18–34 199 (15%) 197 (19%) 244 (23%) 581 (17%)
35–44 199 (15%) 184 (17%) 152 (14%) 534 (15%)
45–54 285 (21%) 167 (16%) 98 (9%) 637 (18%)
55–64 271 (20%) 143 (13%) 124 (12%) 606 (17%)
65–74 191 (14%) 141 (13%) 142 (13%) 482 (14%)
75 207 (15%) 230 (22%) 317 (29%) 651 (19%)
Sex
Female 681 (50%) 572 (54%) 727 (68%) 1863 (53%)
Male 671 (50%) 490 (46%) 350 (32%) 1628 (47%)
Ethnicity
White 793 (59%) 729 (69%) 768 (71%) 2189 (63%)
Black 485 (36%) 282 (27%) 215 (20%) 1103 (32%)
Hispanic 13 (1%) 33 (3%) 22 (2%) 57 (2%)
Asian 11 (1%) 8 (1%) 41 (4%) 41 (1%)
Other 50 (4%) 10 (1%) 31 (3%) 101 (3%)
Admission source
Emergency department 497 (37%) 702 (66%) 548 (51%) 1598 (46%)
Elective or direct admission 855 (63%) 360 (34%) 529 (49%) 1893 (54%)
Service
Medical 710 (53%) 627 (59%) 350 (32%) 1803 (52%)
Surgical 310 (23%) 174 (16%) 270 (25%) 753 (22%)
Oncology 122 (9%) 0 (0%) 186 (17%) 273 (8%)
Obstetrics/Gynecology 55 (4%) 87 (8%) 206 (19%) 243 (7%)
Psychiatry 155 (11%) 174 (16%) 65 (6%) 419 (12%)
Disposition
Discharged 505 (37%) 573 (54%) 639 (59%) 1542 (44%)
Discharged with service needs 93 (7%) 62 (6%) 18 (2%) 208 (6%)
Transferred 97 (7%) 139 (13%) 153 (14%) 332 (10%)
Died in hospital 11 (1%) 8 (1%) 6 (1%) 28 (1%)
Remained hospitalized 646 (48%) 280 (26%) 261 (24%) 1381 (40%)
*Adjusted for sampling frequency among sites.
TABLE 1










Licensed beds 1017 355 260 1632
Total licensed beds on study services 691 (68) 258 (73) 190 (73) 1141 (70)
Staffed study service beds 658 (95) 242 (94) 170 (89) 1073 (94)
Mean floor census on study services 540 (82) 198 (82) 139 (82) 879 (82)
Mean daily nonelective admissions* 34 (6) 28 (14) 19 (14) 81 (9)
Mean LOS of nonelective admissions, days* 4.5 3.7 4.1 4.1
LOS  length of stay.
*Study services only.
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excluded because their hospital stay was complete and final
disposition was established.
The following data were obtained for each patient: basic
demographic information, arrival date, enrollment date (ie,
T0) and discharge date, inpatient unit type (eg, medical,
surgical), source of admission (nonelective vs elective), pro-
cedures, and interventions. The institutional review board
approved the study.
Safe Early Discharge
An expert panel previously determined that patients with less
than a 12% likelihood of a consequential medical event
related to early hospital discharge were appropriate to con-
sider for release during a disaster.8 Consequential medical
event was defined as “unexpected death, irreversible impair-
ment, or reduction in function.”8 Furthermore, medical
events are consequential only if there is an in-hospital inter-
vention with the potential to reverse or prevent additional
deterioration.8 Because it would be unethical for the sole
purpose of advancing science to measure medically conse-
quential events by withholding treatments, a proxy was de-
veloped. The best proxy for a consequential medical event
was determined as initiation or continuation of a critical
intervention (CI).8
CIs were previously defined and weighted on a scale of 1 to
10 based on the risk of a bad outcome.7 For the purposes of
analysis, CIs were placed in 3 categories: major importance
(scale of 7–10), moderate importance (scale of 5–6), and
lower importance (scale of 4). CIs were further classified as
discrete (ie, no continuous aspect, such as defibrillation,
incision, drainage), or continuous, (eg, intravenous medica-
tions, cardiac monitoring).
Analysis and Endpoints
Patient evaluation of 4 days (approximately 96 hours) was
based on experiences with recent major, high-impact disas-
ters, showing that communities should expect to sustain
medical services for 24 to 96 hours,10 and The Joint Com-
mission revised standards requiring hospitals to identify
stand-alone capabilities for the same period.6
Patients were considered to have a CI if a continuous CI
initiated before T0 remained in place or if any (continuous or
discrete) CI occurred after T0. CIs were ranked hierarchically
by importance for patients experiencing more than 1. Pa-
tients without a CI during the 4-day observation period were
considered suitable for early discharge.
The total numbers of study beds for each hospital were
ascertained (Table 1) to estimate the potential for creation of
surge capacity in 2 categories. Daily gross surge capacity was
determined by summing unoccupied staffed beds, opening
unstaffed but licensed beds on the study services, discharging
patients suitable for early release, and routinely discharging
inpatients daily. To be conservative, we assumed availability
of only half the offline licensed beds for the first 24 hours, but
we assumed all licensed beds were available within 48 hours.
To correspond patient-based sampling with bed equivalents,
patient proportionate data were applied to the average floor
census (Table 1). For example, if 33% of patients were
classified as early discharges, 33% of average floor census was
the estimated bed availability.
Net surge capacity was calculated by subtracting from gross
surge capacity the estimated bed requirement from expected
nonelective (emergency) admissions, unrelated to the disaster.
Emergency admissions were acquired from the sampled services’
TABLE 3
Frequency of Critical Interventions*
Criticality7




10 CPR or defibrillation 7
10 Intubation/airway management 158
9 Major surgery 150
9 Cesarean section 16
8 IV medication/pressors/fluids 325
8 Oxygen requirement 53
8 Burn care 0





7 Noninvasive PPV 38




Blood or blood product
administration 117
6 Other invasive procedure 492
6 Psychiatric monitoring 287
6 Cardiac catheterization 26
5 Thoracentesis 18
5 Wound care 38
5 Central line placement/requirement 4
5
Minor surgery: incision and
drainage 20
5 Parenteral nutrition requirement 73
5 Paracentesis 0
5 Vaginal delivery 36
Subtotal 1111 (57%)
Less Critical Interventions
4 Arterial line requirement 0
4 Lumbar puncture 27




3 Support for ADLs 27
Subtotal 56 (3%)
Total patients with at least 1 CI 1950 (56%)
ADLs  activities of daily living; CI  critical intervention; CPR  car-
diopulmonary resuscitation; EKG  electrocardiogram; IV  intravenous;
PPV  positive pulmonary ventilation.
*Hierarchically ordered for highest criticality for each patient.
**Adjusted for sampling frequency among sites.
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official census data during the study period. The estimated
capacity consumed by nonelective admissions was further ad-
justed for actual discharge patterns similarly obtained (Table 1).
Because routine emergency department (ED) visits and admis-
sions are known to decrease during times of “disasters,”11 a
conservative 75% of routine emergency admission volume was
used for calculations. The effects of varying volumes of routine
nonvictim emergency admissions were determined for 25% to
100% of experienced volume as well. The projected gross and
net surge capacities potentially attained were calculated using
staffed study beds as the denominator (Table 1), the standard
figure used to measure capacity.12 It was assumed that all “elec-
tive admissions” could be postponed after 24 hours during a
significant disaster. Surge capacity was determined for each of
the 4 days. To account for the oversampling at the teaching
affiliate and community hospitals, the results were adjusted
based on the relative sampling frequency.
RESULTS
Although facility size varied, the proportion of beds suitable for
study was similar for the academic, teaching affiliate, and com-
munity hospitals (68%, 73%, and 73%, respectively), as was the
proportion of staffed beds and average floor census (Table 1).
There were 4781 patients identified during T0 sampling. Of
these, 504 did not have complete data available. A further
786 patients were excluded because they were discharged on
T0. Accordingly, the detailed study set comprised 3491 dis-
crete patients whose characteristics varied significantly by
hospital (Table 2). The median number of days in the hos-
pital at T0 was 3 (interquartile range 1–7). Case mix of the
sample was similar to the national hospital discharge data.13
Length of stay (LOS) ranged from 3.7 to 4.5 days (Table 1).
Overall LOS nationally at the time was 4.8 days.12
There were 7386 CIs performed on 1950 (56%) patients
during the 4-day evaluation period (Table 3). Most (59%)
CIs were initiated before and continued beyond T0. Of the
remaining CIs, 21%, 10%, 8%, and 3% were initiated on days
1, 2, 3, and 4, respectively. There were 1541 (44%) patients
who had no CIs during the evaluation period. Of these, 562
(37%) had a CI initiated before, but discontinued before, T0
enrollment. These patients thus met criteria for appropriate
early discharge. Only 128 (8%) patients without a CI during
the 4-day evaluation period ultimately had at least 1 CI
performed later in their hospital course, with most (95) of
these initiated at least 6 days beyond T0.
Most CIs were either of major (40%) or moderate (57%)
importance (Table 4). Patients who were considered suitable
for early discharge were 40%, 47%, and 59% of the sample for
the academic, teaching affiliate, and community hospitals,
respectively.
The likelihood of not requiring a CI or being discharged
during the evaluation period varied somewhat by patients’
primary condition: 61% psychiatric, 61% oncological, 71%
surgical, 76% medical, and 93% obstetrical.
Projection of Potential Surge Capacity
Figure 1 shows the potential surge capacity creation for each
day, detailing the contribution of each action. Given the
mean floor census of 82%, each site had on average 18%
readily available capacity at T0 from staffed unoccupied beds
(Table 1). An additional 5% to 9% of capacity, depending on
the site, could be made available if all unstaffed licensed beds
could be resourced (Table 1). In the academic, affiliate, and
community hospitals, 33% (95% CI 29%–36%), 39% (95%
CI 33%–45%), and 48% (95% CI 41%–56%) of beds, re-
spectively, could be made available by early discharge on T0
(Fig. 1). Routine (actual) discharges among patients who
were not suitable for early discharge (ie, experienced a CI,
but discharged) would account for a further 21% (95% CI
18%–24%), 30% (95% CI 25%–36%), 25% (95% CI 19%–
32%) bed capacity, respectively. Gross surge capacity avail-
able from all actions peaked at 77% (95% CI 73%–80%),
95% (95% CI 92%–98%), and 103% (95% CI 88%–118%)
of baseline staffed beds, respectively. However, net surge
capacity (likely availability for disaster victims only) was 66%
(95% CI 63%–70%), 71% (95% CI 66%–77%), and 81%
(95% CI 75%–87%), respectively (Fig. 1). Each 25% reduc-
tion or increase in nonelective admissions results in a net
change of 3% (95% CI 0%–6%), 8% (95% CI 4%–12%),
TABLE 4
Critical Interventions (CIs) Required During Study Period at 3 Hospitals*
Academic Center, N (%) Teaching Affiliate, N (%) Community Hospital, N (%) Adjusted Total,** N (%)
CI
Major importance 351 (26%) 180 (17%) 167 (16%) 783 (22%)
Moderate importance 444 (33%) 344 (32%) 276 (26%) 1111 (32%)
Lower importance 17 (1%) 35 (3%) 1 (0%) 56 (2%)
Any CI (total) 812 (60%) 559 (53%) 444 (41%) 1950 (56%)
No CI performed 540 (40%) 503 (47%) 633 (59%) 1541 (44%)
Total 1352 1062 1077 3491
*Hierarchically ordered for highest criticality for each patient.
**Adjusted for sampling frequency among sites.
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and 7% (95% CI 3%–11%) in net surge capacity, respec-
tively. Reverse triage comprised the majority (50%, 55%,
59%) of surge bed creation.
DISCUSSION
We believe this study challenges the inadequacy of inpatient
surge capacity, at least for catastrophic events with short
duration impact. Although varying somewhat among facili-
ties, the potential effect size of realizable surge capacity was
considerable, ranging from 77% to more than 100% for gross
capacity, and 66% to 81% for net surge capacity. Whereas
net surge capacity provides a sense of bed available strictly for
disaster victims, gross capacity provides an estimate compat-
ible with a utilitarian ethics framework.7,8
The concept of reverse triage advances the utilitarian ap-
proach.8 Disaster victims, those presenting with unrelated
emergencies, and inpatients can be considered equally for
allocation of scarce resources. Homeland Security Presiden-
tial Directive-21 also calls for this approach.3 Others have
advanced a similar notion for the distribution of mechanical
ventilation and other scarce ICU resources during times of
overwhelming need.14–16 Applying the concept of reverse
triage had the greatest effect of creating new capacity in each
facility. Opinion-based survey assessments found significant
capacity augmentation from early discharge if community
resources were available.17,18 However, we believe our study
represents the first empiric evidence for the potential of this
strategy. An even larger percentage of patients could be sent
home safely or avoid admission should the concept of “hos-
pital at home” be available during a disaster.19 Thus, reverse
triage offers an important new approach in the creation of
surge capacity, requiring no substantial resource increment.
Among those who appeared appropriate for early discharge,
8% in fact required a CI beyond 96 hours. Given that the
vast majority were initiated 6 or more days out, one can argue
that the majority of this group would still have been safe for
96 hours in the community. The aggregate risk of early
discharge (at least to low-acuity settings) for this subcohort of
patients until the medical community recovers, appears ac-
ceptable from the utilitarian perspective.8,9 Previous work
indicated a risk tolerance for untoward events due to early
discharge of up to 12% if necessary.8
Our data revealed some unexpected results. Filling open
staffed beds brought considerable contribution to surge cre-
ation, whereas opening unstaffed licensed beds contributed
less. Unstaffed licensed beds were included in the model
because exercising crisis-appropriate (sufficiency) care is an
increasingly acceptable stand-alone hospital response.20–23
Routine daily discharges for patients not deemed initially safe
for discharge also contribute substantially to potential surge.
A key to surge capacity is cancellation of elective admissions,
which is readily achieved.10 Our model conservatively as-
sumed elective admission cancellations only after the first 24
hours. Nonelective admissions are also expected to be lower
than routine. High-acuity visits to EDs during the 2002–2003
severe acute respiratory syndrome (SARS) epidemic de-
creased by 37% in the greater Toronto, Canada, area, al-
though the related decrease in emergency admissions is un-
clear.10 However, a similar study in Taiwan showed a virtual
1:1 relation in the decreased ED visits to decreased admis-
sions during the SARS epidemic.24 The 1994 Northridge, Cal-
ifornia, earthquake experience suggests that ED visits for tradi-
tional conditions (eg, respiratory, fever, gastrointestinal)
decrease after a disaster.25 Furthermore, many elective admis-
sions are processed through EDs for expediency and insurance
concerns,1 inflating emergency admissions during normal times.
Finally, we studied a system of 3 different facilities to gain an
understanding of potential differences in the creation of surge
FIGURE 1
Potential surge capacity. Gross surge capacity and
component contribution are shown in histogram. Net
surge capacity, which accounts for estimated routine
nonvictim emergency admissions, is shown as yellow
background to the bars. T0  initial time of
catastrophic event
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capacity. The experience to date, including the World Trade
Center catastrophe, is that institutions in closest proximity to
the disaster are the ones to be overwhelmed.26 Other centers
may be called into service to accept specialty transfer pa-
tients. With such high levels of capacity potentially avail-
able, a tertiary care center could transfer patients to a lower
acuity center as a means to augment its high capability
capacity further. Although mass evacuations, organized and
ad hoc, have occurred,27,28 the logistics of mass transfers
during widespread crisis have not been addressed well in most
institutions.
In our model, the near full realization of potential surge
capacity occurs within 24 to 48 hours. Being conservative, we
assumed that routine elective admissions on the first day
would still occur, even though many such patients could also
be immediately discharged. We further assumed that only
50% of unstaffed licensed beds could be resourced within 24
hours, reasoning that it would require up to 2 days to staff
appropriately or apply crisis-appropriate care. We also did not
account for patients who could be transferred to low-acuity
settings or hospital at home, and we did not consider resource
intensive capacity modulations, including the use of unli-
censed beds.2,4–7 An even larger percentage of patients could
be safely sent home or avoid admission, should the concept of
hospital at home be available during a disaster.19
Still, the data presented should be approached with some
caution. The study involved only a single health care system.
Nonetheless, each hospital has a unique organization and
constituency and is thus representative of many US hospitals.
Occupancy rates at all 3 hospitals are considered ceilings for
efficiency—much higher than occupancy rates (69%–75%)
experienced across the country in 2005.12 Accordingly, aug-
menting capacity in the study hospitals would generally be a
greater challenge than the average US hospital experience.
No system to date has outright validated our approach using
CIs as a proxy measure of potential untoward events. The
concept was, however, developed and unanimously approved
by a multidisciplinary panel,8 and the derived data are in the
same order as other studies based on opinion.13,14 Finally, the
present report does not provide a framework to predict which
patients are unlikely to require a CI for several ensuing days,
but it does show that if a system predicting risk can be
harnessed, it would be a powerful tool. The authors are
engaged in work that allows this type of assessment in rapid
fashion similar to other risk-predictive instruments.29–31 If
such a system could be developed, then the national Hospital
Available Beds for Emergencies and Disasters system, which
monitors available beds in real time,32 could incorporate the
concepts studied here to estimate potential medical surge at
the national, regional, and local levels.
We did not consider ICUs, newborn nurseries, or pediatrics.
Although the reverse triage concept is the same for these,
previous work was insufficient to allow the methodology to
be applied. Only the academic center has a significant pro-
portion of pediatric patients, and almost all of these patients
are in a distinct building within the medical complex. More
important, this study does not and was not designed to
address capacity concerns for ICU beds, ancillary studies, and
operative and other specialty care.33,34 Despite the apprehen-
sion,4 such concerns have not been shown as a true limitation
in major catastrophic events such as the World Trade Center
disaster and other major events.35,36 Finally, as stated from
the outset, the concept studied here may not lend itself well
to a prolonged event of a biologic nature such as pandemic
influenza. However, the concept may indeed apply to con-
tainable epidemics with wide-reaching effects as was experi-
enced during the SARS epidemic in Toronto.
Conclusions
We believe this investigation represents the first empirical
study to address medical surge capacity. Creation of medical
surge capacity may be greater than previously believed. Re-
verse triage, if appropriately harnessed, can significantly aug-
ment capacity without corresponding increase in resources.
Methods to implement reverse triage and identify patients
suitable for safe early discharge are being developed.
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